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A Hybrid Scheme for Authenticating
Scalable Video Codestreams
Zhuo Wei, Yongdong Wu, Robert H. Deng, and Xuhua Ding
Abstract— A scalable video coding (SVC) codestream consists
of one base layer and possibly several enhancement layers. The
base layer, which contains the lowest quality and resolution
images, is the foundation of the SVC codestream and must
be delivered to recipients, whereas enhancement layers contain
richer contour/texture of images in order to supplement the base
layer in resolution, quality, and temporal scalabilities. This paper
presents a novel hybrid authentication (HAU) scheme. The HAU
employs both cryptographic authentication and content-based
authentication techniques to ensure integrity and authenticity
of the SVC codestreams. Our analysis and experimental results
indicate that the HAU is able to detect malicious manipulations
and locate the tampered image regions while is robust to content-
preserving manipulations for enhancement layers. Although our
focus in this paper is on authenticating H.264/SVC codestreams,
the proposed technique is also applicable to authenticate other
scalable multimedia contents such as MPEG-4 fine grain scala-
bility and JPEG2000 codestreams.
Index Terms— Scalable video coding (SVC), authentication,
integrity protection, cryptography, content-based authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
H .264/SVC (Scalable Video Coding) is a scalable exten-sion of H.264/AVC [1], [2] which encodes video into
scalable video codestream. Since SVC has the property of
quality scalability, spatial scalability, and temporal scalabil-
ity, one SVC codestream can be delivered to various user
devices via different networks as shown in Fig. 1. Nonetheless,
without security measures, an SVC codestream can be easily
modified without any notice such that “seeing is no longer
believing” [3]. An authentication scheme aims to prevent
any unauthorized manipulations by verifying the integrity and
source of data. In addition to the standard requirements of
security, computational efficiency and communication effi-
ciency, an authentication scheme for SVC codestreams should
also provide the following properties:
• Robustness: robust or resilient to content-preserving
manipulations which do not change the semantic meaning
of a codestream.
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Fig. 1. A system for SVC codestream dissemination.
• Sensitivity: able to detect content-changing manipulations
which modify the semantic meaning of a codestream.
• Localization of tampering: able to pinpoint tampered
regions if tampering indeed occurred.
• Scalability: preserving the scalability properties of the
original SVC codestream. That is, the authentication
scheme authenticates an SVC codestream once at the
source, but allows verification of the codestream with
different scalabilities by various user devices [4].
Many authentication schemes have been proposed for
scalable codestreams and they can be classified into three
categories: cryptographic authentication, watermarking-based
authentication and content-based authentication.
Cryptographic authentication techniques, such as digital
signature and Message Authentication Code (MAC), are
applicable to any digital object, including image [4], [5]
and video [6]–[8]. Particular for SVC video authentication,
Yu [9] proposed to hash each enhancement layer and attach
the hash value to the lower layer of the same frame; and
Mokhtarian et al. [10] proposed a packet loss-resilience
authentication scheme for H.264/SVC using hash chain and
error-correction code. However, proposed schemes are gener-
ally very sensitive to content modifications, including content-
changing manipulations, content-preserving manipulations and
bit errors due to transmission or storage noise. Meanwhile,
since proposed schemes depend on the structure of layer
prediction in order to create hash chain, their operations are not
transparent to users. Furthermore, because proposed schemes
had to execute hash function on each layer, their computation
complexity and communication overhead are proportional to
the number of layers in a codestream.
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Watermarking-based authentication schemes, such as [11]
and [12], embed a reference object (e.g., image or mes-
sage) into an SVC codestream. Grois et al. [13] reviewed
recent watermarking-based authentication schemes for SVC.
As the reference object and the SVC codestream are mixed
together, the embedded reference object will be tampered if
the SVC codestream is maliciously tampered. For example,
Meerwald and Uhl [14] designed a robust watermarking
authentication by embedding the same watermark into both
base layer and enhancement layers for quality/spatial scalabil-
ities; Shi et al. [15] proposed a scalable and credible water-
marking algorithm for SVC as part of a copyright protection
system; and Park et al. [16], [17] combined encryption and
watermarking techniques to achieve authentication and copy
protection of H.264/AVC and SVC codestreams. For the sake
of robustness and security, watermarking-based authentication
schemes must embed the reference object into each layer of an
SVC codestream, otherwise the non-watermarked layers can
be easily tampered without being detected. However, since
most quantized coefficients of enhancement layers are zero,
embedding watermarking into each layer is in conflict with
the limited embedding capacity.
Content-based authentication schemes ensure the authen-
ticity of video features such as edges, the feature of
Matrix transform [18]–[20], the rotation-invariant feature of
Fourier-Mellin transformation [21], and the feature of wavelet
domain [22]–[24]. To authenticate a codestream, a content
provider extracts its multimedia features, generates a reference
object with the extracted features, and delivers the reference
object to end users via a secure channel [25]. Upon receiving
the video codestream and the reference object, an end user
extracts the video features as the provider did, and checks
whether the extracted features match those in the reference
object. In such schemes, the feature extraction method must be
robust against content-preserving manipulations, but sensitive
to content-changing manipulations.
This paper presents a hybrid authentication scheme for
SVC codestreams, named HAU. HAU integrates authentication
operations into the SVC coding process, and exploits both
cryptographic authentication and content-based authentication
techniques. In HAU, a content provider first extracts the
features of original frames, and calculates the MAC of the base
layer’s codestream in each frame. The provider then delivers
the frames along with the MAC values and the extracted
features to a receiver. At the receiver side, the received
base layer’s codestream of a frame is verified based on the
corresponding MAC value. In addition, if the received SVC
codestream also contains enhancement layers, the decoded
higher quality/resolution frames are verified based on extracted
features. If and only if MAC and features in a frame are
verified successfully, the received frame is accepted. In our
implementation, the NMF-NMF-SQ hash [19] is adopted
for feature extraction because it performs the best in terms
of robustness and sensitivity [26]. Analysis indicates that
HAU is efficient in terms of computation complexity and
communication overhead, preserves the scalability property
of SVC bitstreams, and is transparent to users. Experimental
results demonstrate that HAU is robust to the transcoding of
Fig. 2. An example H.264/SVC codestream with scalability in three
dimensions. There are 4 temporal layers, 1 spatial layers, and 1 quality layer.
quality and resolution enhancement layers and sensitive to
typical attacks on quality and resolution enhancement layers.
Although HAU is proposed for H.264/SVC, it is equally
applicable to other scalable multimedia codestreams (e.g.,
MPEG-4 and JPEG2000) which follow the “layered” frame
structure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides a brief overview of the H.264/SVC standard, presents
the NMF-NMF-SQ hashing algorithm for multimedia feature
extraction, and discusses the challenges of authenticating SVC
codestreams. The proposed HAU scheme is explained in
Section III. Section IV presents our performance analysis,
and Section V shows our experimental results and compares
HAU with existing authentication schemes in the literature.
Section VI draws some concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides a quick overview of the H.264/SVC
standard, presents the NMF-NMF-SQ hashing algorithm,
and shows a naive single-layer content-based authentication
scheme to illustrate the technical challenges in authenticating
SVC codestreams.
A. H.264/SVC Standard
An SVC codestream is divided into a base layer and one or
more enhancement layers, and each layer is further divided
into NALUs (Network Abstract Layer Unit). Due to the
flexible arrangement of NALUs, SVC provides three kinds of
scalabilities for the sake of bit-rate adaptation to network band-
width and/or end devices’ capabilities, as depicted in Fig. 2.
The three axes in Fig. 2 correspond to three-dimensional
scalabilities of H.264/SVC, i.e., temporal, quality, and spatial
scalabilities. Lines with various width and length in Fig. 2 refer
to frames belonging to different layers. Specifically, wider one
is at quality enhancement layer while longer one is at spatial
enhancement layer. In addition, the texts Dx Qy Tz nearby lines
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indicate frames’ spatial, quality, and temporal identification.
If and only if both x and y are equal to zero, frames (lines)
belong to the base layer. Otherwise, frames (lines) belong to
enhancement layers. Assuming the GOP (Group Of Picture)
size a H.264/SVC codestream is nine, based on hierarchical
prediction structure, nine frames will be classed into four
temporal layers as shown in Fig. 2. Where the numbers (0 to 8)
are the order of nine frames inside GOP.
1) Temporal Scalability: As frames in the temporal base
layers are encoded with the highest fidelity, and a lower
temporal layer is used as references for motion-compensated
prediction of frames in higher temporal layers, temporal scal-
able coding can be readily achieved, i.e., by simply discarding
the higher-layer frames for an SVC codestream, a lower bit-
rate one is formed.
2) Spatial Scalability: The spatial base layer represents a
video of the lowest resolution while the spatial enhancement
layers increase the resolutions of the video. Since inter-layer
prediction is used, a lower spatial layer must be presented if a
higher spatial layer exists but not the other way around. There-
fore, when the spatial layers are discarded starting from the
highest layer, the rest of the spatial layers are still decodable.
This discarding process can be repeated until only one layer
(the base layer) remains. In other words, the resolution of a
video can be decreased directly and gradually.
3) Quality Scalability: The quality base layer is encoded at
the lowest visual quality, and the quality enhancement layers
increase the visual quality of the decoded sequence. Therefore,
when the quality layers are discarded starting from the highest
layer, the rest of the quality layers are still decodable. This
discarding process can be repeated until only one quality layer
remains.
B. NMF-NMF-SQ
The NMF (Non-negative Matrix Factorization) algorithm
[27] is able to decompose a non-negative matrix into two non-
negative matrix factors. Monga and Mihcak [19] pointed out
that NMFs have two very desirable properties for secure image
hashing applications: (1) the additivity property resulting from
the non-negativity constraints results in bases that capture
local components of the image, thereby significantly reducing
misclassification; and (2) the effect of geometric attacks on
images in the spatial domain manifests (approximately) as
independently identically distributed noise on NMF vectors,
allowing the design of detectors that are both computationally
simple and, at the same time, optimal in the sense of minimiz-
ing error probabilities. By exploiting the NMF algorithm, they
proposed a robust and secure image hashing methods, named
NMF-NMF-SQ hashing, as follows.
• Given an image I, pseudorandomly select p overlapping
subimages Ai with size m × m, 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
• Perform a rank r1 NMF transform on each subimage
(r1  m), Ai ≈ Wi × FTi , where Wi and Fi are m × r1
matrices, FTi is the transpose of Fi .
• Randomly arrange the matrices Wi and Fi into a new
image J with size m × 2 pr1.
• Perform a rank r2 NMF transform on J, J ≈ W × H,
where the size of W is m × r2 and the size of H is
r2 × 2 pr1.
• Concatenate the columns of W with the rows of H as a
hash vector h. Denote the length of h as v.
• Generate pseudorandom weight vectors {ti }ui=1 (u ≤ v)
with a secret ke, where each ti is the length of v.
Let Vi = 〈h, ti 〉 be the inner product of vector h and
vector ti . The hash is {V1, · · · , Vu}.
NMF-NMF-SQ is very robust to a large class of perceptually
insignificant manipulations. For example, it can tolerate the
JPEG compression with quality factor QF = 1% [26].
As H.264/SVC utilizes a similar integer Discrete Cosine
Transform (DCT) as the JPEG standard, the robustness prop-
erty is suitable for H.264/SVC codestream too [28]. Based on
the tampering detection dataset CASIA [29], our experimental
results on H.264 codestreams indicate that NMF-NMF-SQ
indeed keeps excellent robustness and sensitivity property
when Q P (Quantization Parameter) of an image is no more
than 38. Actually, each content-based feature has its own
robustness range for content-preserving and content-changing
manipulations, we name this threshold as τ , e.g., τ of NMF-
NMF-SQ is 38 for H.264 codestreams.
C. A Naive Single Layer Content-Based Authentication
In an SVC codestream, the base layer is used to construct
the lowest quality/resolution images while enhancement layers
supplement the base layer for higher quality/resolution images.
For example, an SVC codestream consists of one base layer
with Q P45 (PSNR = 31.56) and two quality enhancement
layers with Q P35 (PSNR = 35.42) and Q P20 (PSNR = 47.04),
respectively, where Q Px means that Q P is x . A smaller x
will result in better image quality while a bigger x will result
in lower image quality. Fig. 3(a) illustrates that the image
decoded from only base layer is blurred at some finer fields,
e.g., facial features or texture of clothes. Fig. 3(b) illustrates a
higher quality image decoded from base layer and two quality
enhancement layers, which contains richer texture information
of the image. Note that there are two ways of feature extraction
if content-based authentication is applied to SVC codestreams.
• Features are extracted from the base layer of an SVC
codestream (i.e., Fig. 3(a)). Obviously, the base layer
can be directly authenticated using the extracted fea-
tures. However, if a decoded image consists of the base
layer and enhancement layers, such as Fig. 3(b), using
the features extracted from the base layer to verify
the higher quality/resolution image may produce false
rejection error. For example, as the clothes contain clear
contour/texture fields as shown in Fig. 3(b) while Fig. 3(a)
is indistinct, these fields will be regarded as insertion or
replacement attack by content-based authentication.
• Features1 are extracted from the highest quality/resolution
image containing the richest texture/contour [i.e.,
Fig. 3(b))] Higher quality/resolution images including
1There may be many enhancement layers in an SVC codestream, we assume
that Q P of the lowest quality enhancement layer is no more than τ of this
feature.
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Fig. 3. Images quantified by different QPs. (a) Blur image decoded from only base layer Q P45. (b) Clear image decoded from base and enhancement layers
Q P20.
the base layer and partial/all enhancement layers can be
verified because the extracted features are robust to a
certain compression range and resolution-sampling rate
(i.e., τ ). However, since the compression or resolution
sampling of the base layer images is beyond the scope
of the robustness, the blurred images may be thought as
deleting attack, e.g., handles of right arrows as shown
in Fig. 3(a).
Based on the above observation, we conclude that content-
based authentication can not simultaneously protect both base
layer and enhancement layers of SVC if features extracted
from a single layer are only used for authentication.
III. HYBRID AUTHENTICATION
In an SVC codestream, the base layer consists of the
lowest quality/resolution images, and it must be transmit-
ted intact to the receiver in any case. Meanwhile, it is
unnecessary to transcode (i.e., re-compress or re-sample)
the base layer because it contains the very basic informa-
tion. Therefore, the base layer can be protected by cryp-
tographic authentication. On the other hand, higher quality
and resolution images are decoded from base layer and
enhancement layers, and their content-based features are
robust. Based on Subsection II-C, if features are extracted
from the highest quality and resolution images, content-based
authentication is suitable for authenticating enhancement lay-
ers.2 Hence, it is reasonable to integrate cryptographic authen-
tication and content-based authentication techniques in order
to flexibly authenticate SVC codestreams. Operations of HAU
2Note that HAU does not authenticate enhancement layers themselves,
it actually authenticates decoded images containing both base layer and
enhancement layers.
are shown in Fig. 4, where the provider creates an authen-
tication tag for an SVC codestream and the receiver verifies
the tag against the received codestream. MANE (Media Aware
Network Elements), which receive feedback messages about
the terminal capabilities and/or channel conditions, can remove
the non-required parts from a scalable bit stream based on its
Dx Qy Tz , before forwarding it.
A. Authentication Tag Generation
The authentication tag generation process includes MAC
generation and feature extraction, where MACs are constructed
by taking the encoded image of the base layer and a secret key
as inputs, while the features of each frame are extracted from
the highest quality and resolution images of SVC bitstreams.
Note that if an SVC codestream has spatial enhancement
layers, HAU should initially downsample the largest resolution
to the same resolution as the base layer, then extracts features
from the downsampled one. Hence, length of the feature value
is related to the base layer’s resolution for each AU (Access
Unit).
1) Message Authentication Codes: With a standard one-way
hash functionH(·) for the encoded frame , the provider takes
its base layer b and a key kb shared by provider and receiver
as input to produce MAC φ as
φ = H(kb,b) (1)
2) Feature Extraction: HAU extracts content-based fea-
tures which are sensitive to content-changing manipulation
but robust to content-preserving manipulations in case of
large Q P . The candidate features include invariant histogram
statistics [30]–[34] and relation between low frequency DCT
coefficients [35], [36]. With reference to Subsection II-B, HAU
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Fig. 4. Diagram of HAU.
employs NMF-NMF-SQ hashing [19] to produce content-
based feature. After obtaining the hash vector h of each AU,
pseudorandom weight vectors {ti }ui=1 (u ≤ v) are generated
using AES with the secret key ke3 and an initialization vec-
tor I V . The ke is shared by the content sender and receiver and
the initialization vector I V consists of scalable information
(i.e., temporal identifiers) and slice header of base layer. At
last, HAU executes inner product of vector h and vector ti to
produce V = {V1, V2, · · · , Vu}.
B. Tag Conveyance
It is necessary to deliver the authentication tag (i.e., feature
hash V and MAC φ) to the receiver together with the SVC
codestream for verification. In HAU, we encapsulate the tag
into SVC user data as a new SEI (Supplement Enhancement
Information) NALU as was done in [10]. The payload type
of the new SEI is Unregistered User Data Message so as to
preserve SVC format. After receiving the SVC codestream
embedded with the tag, the receiver can detect the new SEI
based on its UUID (Universally Unique Identifier) and directly
obtain the tag, i.e., NMF-NMF-SQ hash and MAC.
Alternatively, watermarking can be used for delivering V ,
e.g., embedding V into the base layer. As we know, the
quality of the watermarked base layer will decrease, however,
it does not affect SVC applications because base layer is
substantially used for previewing. Assuming that a base layer’s
resolution is 176 × 144, there are 1584 of 4 × 4 blocks
which is the watermarking capacity. NMF-NMF-SQ produces
V which contains 32 hashing components (i.e., u = 32),
and each component needs 12 bits, so the feature length is
around 384 bits for each AU. Hence, there is sufficient capacity
for embedding V into the base layer. At the receiver side,
the embedded V can be fully recovered for verifying the
enhancement layers.
3Both kb and ke can be derived from a secret key k, which is shared between
the content provide and the receiver.
C. Tag Verification
After receiving the codestream and obtaining the tag, the
receiver performs HAU verification including the base layer
verification and enhancement layer verification.
1) Verification of the Base Layer: For the base layer b in
a received frame  , HAU first calculates its MAC value ψ as
ψ = H(kb,b). (2)
If ψ = φ, HAU accepts the base layer as shown in Fig. 4.
Otherwise, the base layer is considered tampered and HAU
directly rejects the base layer and all the enhancement layers
of  .
Simultaneously, temporal scalability is also verified by
cryptographic authentication because the time stamp and frame
number of each frame are authenticated by MAC, hence, HAU
can detect frame reordering attack in which the temporal order
of frames are changed.
2) Verification of Enhancement Layer: Upon acceptance
of the base layer b, the receiver continues to verify the
received enhancement layers. This verification process con-
tains coarse verification and fine content-based verification.
Coarse verification makes use of the relationship between the
base layer and enhancement layers (quality or resolution) to
initially and quickly verify integrity of enhancement layers.
If coarse verification does not identify manipulation, content-
based verification will be employed with the collected features
V and V˜ (features extracted from received frames) to further
ensure trustworthiness of enhancement layers.
a) Coarse Verification: H.264/SVC makes use of 4 × 4
blocks as a unit to compress images with different Q P . Let
Si be the sum of the original pixel values in the block Bi
(where i is the order number of 4 × 4 block), and S˜i is the
sum of pixel values in Bi quantized by Q P ∈ (0, 52]. Define
the block-based error for block Bi as
δi = |S˜i − Si | (3)
548 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 9, NO. 4, APRIL 2014
Fig. 5. Relationship between error  and Q P .
We tested 8000 images randomly chosen from the CASIA
image gallery [29] and obtained the maximal block-based error
 = max∀i δi under Q P as shown in Fig. 5, where the
maximum error  increases slowly in interval Q P ∈ (0, 35],
but increases rapidly beyond Q P35.
HAU exploits the above characteristics to coarsely verify the
integrity of enhancement layers. Technically, given the base
layer b and enhancement layer e, HAU calculates their
block-based error. If the error δi ≤  for the base layer Q P ,
the enhancement layer for block Bi is authentic. For example,
with reference to Fig. 5, (40) ≈ 251 for the base layer Q P40.
If a block error is over 251, the block of the enhancement layer
is suspicious and the tampering is located. Similarly, for spatial
scalability, we first downsample the received higher resolution
image, then calculate block-based error with the base layer.
Generally, meaningful content attacks will cause error δi larger
than  because they change texture, luminance, or color
of attacked blocks. Our SVC experiments on the random
8000 images [29] indicate that coarse verification can detect
around 98% of the attacks when Q P is no more than 35 (i.e.,
(35) ≈ 100) while it begins causing false negative for some
attacked images when Q P is larger than 35. Hence, with Q P
of base layer being no more than 35, coarse verification can
be very efficient in detecting obvious attacked/suspicious field,
which reduce the computation complexity of HAU.
b) Content-Based Verification: However, since coarse
verification only considers energy changes of image and
ignores small changes of image content, it may fail to detect
some attacks (e.g., content-changing manipulations of knowl-
edgeable attackers) which have small effect on block error
δ. Hence, HAU further uses content-based authentication to
verify the feature integrity. As the provider, with the shared
key ke and I V , the receiver extracts feature V˜ from the image
I decoded from  which contains base layer and the received
enhancement layers as shown in Fig. 4. HAU calculates the
error e =‖ V˜ − V ‖. If e falls within the robustness range
of content-based feature, the frame including both base layer
and enhancement layers is accepted, otherwise, the frame I is
regarded to have been modified. For detailed analysis on the
detection performance, including the probabilities of miss and
false alarms, the reader is referred to [19].
IV. ANALYSIS
In HAU, there are two stages for SVC authentication. In
the first stage, HAU checks the integrity of the base layer
with cryptographic primitives. If and only if the base layer is
authentic, HAU continues to the second stage for verifying the
integrity of received enhancement layers.
Security: In a typical SVC codestream, the base layer
must be transmitted intact and without undergoing any
compression/downsampling operation in the transmission.
Hence, in the first stage, HAU takes kb and b as input, and
outputs an MAC. The MAC value ensures that a receiver who
knows the secret key kb can detect any changes to the base
layer.
On the other hand, besides the base layer, SVC bitstreams
also supply various quality and resolution (sub)codestreams
to clients using different enhancement layers. These
(sub)codestreams have the same content such that their cor-
responding content-based features are robust. HAU takes
advantage of this robustness property of various SVC
(sub)codestreams. As required by the NMF-NMF-SQ algo-
rithm, {ti }ui=1 pseudorandom weight vectors are generated
using AES with the secret key ke and an initialization vector
IV. When a stream ciphers such as AES is used, the initial-
ization vector IV should be unique for each AU such that the
resulting pseudorandom vectors do not repeat themselves. In
HAU, I V is generated as
I V = F(Hn, Hs). (4)
where F is a one-way function, Hn represents the SVC
scalable information (e.g., temporal identifier), and HS denotes
the slice header of base layer which is protected by MAC.
Because the header information is in clear text, I V can be
deduced from the SVC bitstream at the decoder/verifier side.
Format-transparency: In HAU, as the authentication tag
is encapsulated into SEI units or embedded into the base
layer, the protected codestream is still an SVC codestream
so that a standard SVC coder can decode it without crashing.
In addition, since it does not change the standard structure of
the SVC codestream (e.g., SVC header and slice header), it
preserves its scalability property. Therefore, HAU is format-
transparent.
Generality: On the one hand, HAU can adopt any cryp-
tographic authentication algorithm, feature extraction algo-
rithm and content-based authentication technique depending
on requirements of application scenarios. On the other hand,
although Section III presents HAU for H.264/SVC code-
streams, HAU is applicable to all the multimedia data con-
taining one base layer and one or more enhancement layers,
such as MPEG-4 FGS.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In our experiments, we choose twelve standard bench-
mark video sequences4 in order to cover different combi-
nations of video characteristics, including motion (fast/slow,
pan/zoom/rotation), color (bright/dull), contrast (high/low),
and object type (vehicle, buildings, people). Bus (150 frames)
and Foreman (300 frames) are of less camera motion
while Football (260 frames), Container (300 frames) and
Soccer (300 frames) demonstrate camera panning and zoom-
ing with object motion and background texture. Bridge-far
(300 frames) and Bridge-close (500 frames) show images with
smooth motion. Highway (1200 frames) is a sequence of fast
4Available at http://media.xiph.org/video/derf/
WEI et al.: HYBRID SCHEME FOR AUTHENTICATING SCALABLE VIDEO CODESTREAMS 549
motion while Silent (300 frames) and News (300 frames) are
static sequences except of motion of partial fields. Mobile
(300 frames) and Hall (300 frames) sequences display a
still complex background with foreground motion. These
sequences are encoded into SVC codestreams by JSVM 9.19
[37] to evaluate the robustness of HAU and data set [29]
is used to assess the sensitivity of HAU. SHA-256 is used
to calculate the MAC. In our authentication experiments,
SVC GOP size and Intra period are set to 8; the Q Ps of
enhancement layers are no more than 38 so that the features
extracted with NMF-NMF-SQ are stable.
A. Robustness
The base layer is authenticated by cryptographic authen-
tication such that HAU is sensitive to any modification to
the base layer. Although SVC enhancement layers (quality
or resolution) can provide flexible scalability for different
situations, it is possible that transcoding of enhancement
layers is still required, i.e., reducing bit-rates/resolution of
SVC codestreams, to adapt to variable network bandwidth or
terminal devices’ resolution.
Recompression: The first transcoding approach of enhance-
ment layers is recompression of the DCT coefficients with
a larger quantization step size in order to reduce the bit
rate of enhancement layers. The recompression involves par-
tial decoding and partial recoding operations, e.g., quantiza-
tion/inverse quantization, and entropy coding/decoding [38].
Partial decoding first executes entropy decoding for the SVC
enhancement layer codestream to recover quantized coeffi-
cients, then performs inverse quantization on those quan-
tized coefficients to restore DCT coefficients. Partial recoding
encodes those DCT coefficients using different Q P and oper-
ates entropy encoding for the new quantized coefficients in
order to degrade quality of enhancement layers.
Resolution changing: The second acceptable transcoding
is resolution changing, which changes the frame size down
to a smaller one, e.g., the conversion of the resolution of
enhancement layer from 4CIF to CIF. The resolution changing
of enhancement layers consists of decoding, downsampling,
and re-encoding. Decoding and re-encoding comply with
H.264 standard while downsampling is the process of reducing
the sampling rate of a signal.
Although recompression/resolution changing on enhance-
ment layers adjusts bit rate/resolution of SVC codestreams,
SVC content is not affected. Hence, HAU can still verify these
enhancement layers because extracted features are robust to
content-preserving manipulations [19] as long as QP is less
than 38.
B. Sensitivity and Tampering Detection
Assume an attacker arbitrarily manipulates the enhancement
layers, e.g., color change, luminance change, feature inserting,
feature replacing, and feature deleting, HAU can reject these
content-changing manipulations and locate tampered regions.
1) Color Attack: The color change attack can be quickly
detected by coarse verification because its block-based error
is usually larger than . For example, given the original image
Fig. 6. Color attack. (a) Original image. (b) Tampered image. (c) Detection.
Fig. 7. Luminance attack. (a) Original image. (b) Tampered image.
(c) Detection.
Fig. 6(a) and the attacked Fig. 6(b) where the flower color is
changed from yellow to white, Fig. 6(c) shows the tampered
locations highlighted by black blocks. The average δi of these
attacked blocks are 491.
2) Luminance Attack: In Fig. 7, the luminance contrast of
ice block is modified from light to dark. Similar to color
attack, coarse verification can effectively detect the tampered
locations. The highlighted parts (i.e., the white blocks) are the
tampered locations as shown in Fig. 7(c), the corresponding
δi of the attacked blocks is 692.
3) Feature Manipulation: Besides performing the above
simple color and luminance attacks of enhancement layers,
an adversary may modify semantic meaning by inserting,
deleting, and replacing objects of enhancement layers. In these
cases, coarse verification can detect these complex manipu-
lations too. For example, Fig. 8(b) shows one small horse
is removed, Fig. 8(e) shows the arrows o image. Fig. 8(h)
and (k) illustrate object and background replacing attacks, e.g,.
number 1 is replaced by number 7 and the tiger’s background
is replaced.
It is possible that an adversary may change content of
images but have little effect on block-based error so that coarse
verification fails to detect attacks. For example, Fig. 8(n) is the
original image with one boat while Fig. 8(m) illustrates one
more boat is inserted. Since the inserting causes limited block-
based error, coarse verification will fail. Luckily, content-based
authentication is able to detect these tampered fields.
C. Computation Complexity
The computation complexity of HAU is measured using tg ,
the time for tag generation, and tv , the time for tag verification.
The former consists of feature extraction time te and MAC
computation time tb. Usually, tb  te and can be omitted.
According to [19],
te = p · o(m2r1) + o(2mpr1r2) + o(mr2 + 2 pr1r2). (5)
where the first term is due to the NMF-NMF hash algorithm
which does a rank r1 NMF on p · m × m matrices, the second
term is due to the rank r2 approximation which is obtained
from the resulting m × 2 pr1 matrix, and the third term is
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Fig. 8. Feature attack. (a) Original image. (b) Tampered image. (c) Detection.
(d) Original image. (e) Tampered image. (f) Detection. (g) Original image.
(h) Tampered image. (i) Detection. (j) Original image. (k) Tampered image.
(l) Detection. (m) Original image. (n) Tampered image. (o) Detection.
due to pseudorandom statistics obtained from the resulting
NMF-NMF vector of length mr2 + 2 pr1r2.
On the other hand, the verification time tv includes tb, te,
and the coarse verification time given by
tc = q · (sub + 15 × add). (6)
where q is the number of 4 × 4 blocks, and sub and add
indicate subtraction and addition operations, respectively.
The experiments on Ubuntu 10.04 were carried out on a PC
with 2.53GHz Intel dual-core processor. The parameters were
p = 10, m = 50, r1 = 2, r2 = 1 and u = 32 for one hundred
thousand of QCIF (i.e., the resolution is 176×144) images. We
designed our experiments based on N M Flib,5 and employed
nmf_alspg (alternating least squares using a projected gradient
method) to compute the factorization. Experimental results
showed that the three terms in (5) are 3464.5 μs, 210 μs,
and 62.84 μs, respectively, which result in a tg of 3737.34
μs. On the other hand, tc of QCIF is 191 μs. Therefore, tv is
about 3928.34 μs for each frame.
5http://www.ee.columbia.edu/∼grindlay/code.html
D. Communication Overhead
For each frame, HAU’s communication overhead is l =
lb + le + lh bytes, where lb denotes a fixed-length overhead
for base layer authentication, le is the size of the enhancement
layers features, and lh is the header size for an SEI. Typically,
we select lb = 32 and lh = 19, hence,
l = 32 + le + 19 = 51 + le. (7)
With regard to (7), for the experiments of quality scalability
whose base layer resolution is CIF (352 × 288), i.e., u = 64,
the length of communication overhead is about 147 bytes for
each frame. Encoded SVC codestreams (Soccer, Bus, Football,
Container, Bridge-close, highway) contain three quality layers
(i.e., Q P40, Q P30, and Q P20). Table I shows that the average
overhead of quality scalability is 2.42%. For spatial scalability
experiments whose base layer resolution is QCIF, i.e, u = 32,
the length of communication overhead is about 99 bytes for
each frame. The encoded SVC codestreams (Mobile, Foreman,
Hall, News, Silence, Bridge-far) have one base layer (QCIF,
Q P40) and two enhancement layers (CIF, Q P35, Q P20).
Table II illustrates the overhead of spatial scalability for differ-
ent SVC sequences. The average overhead of spatial scalability
is 2.16%.
Note that the extracted features V can be embedded into
the base layer and delivered to receivers. Meanwhile, since
base layer bitstream is authenticated by cryptographic authen-
tication, the embedding watermarking (i.e., content-based
features) can be extracted from base layer without mis-
takes and used to verify received enhancement layers at
receivers sides. Because HAU is general scheme, H.264/AVC
watermarking schemes can be utilized for feature embed-
ding in our HAU, e.g., the hybrid watermarking scheme
of H.264/AVC [39]. It embeds the watermarking into DCT
coefficients and motion vectors by modifying the lagrangian
optimization function in order to curb the bit-rate increase.
Experimental results [39] showed that the increasing bit rate
of base layer is negligible as compared with SEI NALU
size (lb = 32 and lh = 19). Hence, the total codestream’s
communication overhead is about 51 bytes for each AU, i.e.,
the average overhead for quality and spatial scalability are
1.11% and 1.02%, respectively.
E. Comparison
As HAU exploits the characteristics of SVC to ensure
its authenticity, it is robust to content-preserving manipu-
lations but sensitive to content-changing manipulations of
enhancement layers. However, cryptographic authentication is
sensitive to any bit change of SVC and watermarking-based
is semi-fragile to content-preserving manipulations. In other
words, HAU achieves a good balance between robustness and
sensitivity as shown in the second column of Table III. The
third column indicates that cryptographic authentication can
not locate tampered areas.
Furthermore, the fourth column of Table III shows that
HAU only depends on base layer and content-based features
of the highest quality/resolution images, while cryptographic
authentication and watermarking-based authentication must
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TABLE I
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF QUALITY SCALABILITY
TABLE II
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF SPATIAL SCALABILITY
TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH OTHER H.264/SVC AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
involve every layer of SVC to prevent the attacks on unpro-
tected layers. In the fifth column of Table III, cryptographic
authentication and watermarking-based authentication depend
on layer prediction relationship of SVC in order to construct
hashing chain or embed watermarking. HAU is independent
of SVC structure since HAU only considers the authentication
of base layer’s codestream and content-based features of SVC,
hence HAU is transparent to users.
The last column illustrates the communication overhead.
In our SVC experiments, GOP size is 8 and encoded SVC
sequences have three layers (one base layer and two enhance-
ment layers). The cryptographic authentication [10] appends
960 bytes overhead per GOP (i.e., each frame has 120 bytes
overhead). Hence, the average overheads of the scheme [10]
are 2.19% and 2.62% of the original codestream for quality
and spatial scalability, respectively. In general, HAU pro-
duces the smallest communication overhead as shown at the
last column of Table III, except the similar communica-
tion overhead on quality scalability as that of cryptographic
authentication. In addition, HAU’s communication overhead
is constant, but the overhead of cryptographic authentication
[10] and watermarking-based authentication [14] increase with
the number of enhancement layers. For example, with GOP
size being 8, each frame will carry 40 bytes more overhead
[10] when an SVC sequence contains one more enhancement
layer.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a hybrid authentication scheme
for SVC, named HAU, which processes the base layer
and enhancement layers using cryptographic authentication
and content-based authentication, respectively. Cryptographic
authentication ensures the integrity of the base layer while
content-based authentication verifies enhancement layers using
extracted features. HAU is secure, SVC format-transparent,
light-weight in communication overhead and low in compu-
tational complexity. Our analysis and experiments indicated
that HAU is robust to content-perserving manipulations but
sensitive to content-changing manipulations.
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